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ABSTRACT
Brazilian companies with a Big 4 auditor have better accounting quality than those with a local auditor, when 
accounting quality is measured either by compliance with GAAP or by conservatism. However, the cross-sectional 
pattern of discretionary accruals—often used to measure accounting quality in other countries—is unrelated 
to quality in Brazil. In fact, companies with Big 4 auditors tend to recognize income more aggressively than 
companies with a local auditor. This is the opposite of what happens in other countries and it is consistent with 
local auditors interpreting the tax code (rather than GAAP) more aggressively than Big 4 auditors, due to the 
strong linkage that exists between the Brazilian tax code and fi nancial reporting standards.
Keywords: Accounting Quality; Auditor Choice; Discretionary Accruals; REFIS; Tax-To-GAAP Conformity.
RESUMO
As empresas brasileiras com um auditor do grupo das “Big 4” têm melhor qualidade de contabilidade do que aquelas 
com um auditor local, quando a medição de tal qualidade da contabilidade se dá ou pela aderência aos PCGA ou pelo 
conservadorismo. Entretanto, a aplicação de um padrão de análise levando em conta as provisões contábeis voluntárias 
– modelo usado freqüentemente para medir a qualidade da contabilidade em outros paises – não serve para avaliar a 
qualidade da contabilidade no Brasil.  Na verdade, empresas com auditores do grupo das “Big 4” tendem a reconhecer 
lucros mais agressivamente do que clientes de auditores locais. Isto é o oposto do que se constata em outros países e é 
consistente com o fato de que os auditores locais interpretam as leis tributárias (e não os PCGA) mais agressivamente 
do que os auditores do grupo das “Big 4” devido à forte ligação entre a legislação tributária brasileira e as respectivas 
normas referentes ao preparo de demonstrações fi nanceiras. 
Palavras-chave: Qualidade da Contabilidade; Escolha do Auditor; Provisões Contábeis Voluntárias; REFIS; 
Conformidade entre Normas Tributárias e PCGA.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Is it true in Brazil—as it appears to be in many other 
countries—that companies that hire a Big 41 auditor pro-
duce better accounting disclosures than companies that 
hire a local auditor? This question involves more than a 
replication of similar studies conducted for other countries 
because of two special features of the Brazilian environ-
ment. The fi rst is leniency in the enforcement of generally 
accepted accounting principles by Brazilian regulatory 
agencies (La PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES and SHLEIFER, 
1998; PATEL, BALIC and BWAKIRA, 2002.) The second fe-
ature is the existence of a strong linkage between the Bra-
zilian tax code and fi nancial reporting principles (HUNG, 
2001; Appendix A.)
Leniency does not imply that quality is irrelevant for 
companies and auditors because alternative mechanisms 
arise to impose accounting discipline. For example, a higher 
quality of earnings is associated with lower costs of capi-
tal (BOTOSAN, 1997; RICHARDSON and WELKER, 2001; 
HRIBAR and JENKINS, 2004; and FRANCIS, LaFOND and 
OLSSON, 2004.) In addition, where enforcement is weak 
but the GAAP framework is strong, fi rms may attempt to 
differentiate themselves in terms of accounting quality by 
choosing a reputable auditor (HOLTHAUSEN, 2003.) Still, 
it is an empirical question whether Brazilian fi rms rely on 
auditor choice as a signal of quality.
A strong linkage between tax and fi nancial reporting 
transforms into a serious handicap a common feature of 
many studies of quality and auditor choice (e.g: JONES, 
1991; DECHOW, SLOAN and SWEENEY, 1995): the assump-
tion that Big 4 auditors, because of their large reputation 
capital and “deep pockets,” will try to impose conservative 
accounting methods (i.e., income reducing accruals), more 
often than their smaller competitors will. The problem with 
this assumption, under strong tax-GAAP conformity, is that 
minimization of income in the fi nancial statements leads to 
minimization of income in the tax return, and the latter may 
cause problems with the tax authority. Thus, it is no longer 
clear whether the Big 4 would prefer income increasing or 
income decreasing discretionary accruals.
Using a sample of 97 publicly traded fi rms that adopted 
the REFIS tax amnesty of 2000, it was found that there is 
no difference in quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audi-
tors if quality is measured by the behavior of discretionary 
accruals, but signifi cant differences were found in quality 
using compliance with GAAP and conservatism as indica-
tors of quality. These results support the hypothesis that 
Brazilian fi rms use Big 4 auditors as a signal of quality, and 
show that discretionary accrual behavior is an unreliable 
indicator of quality under strong tax-GAAP conformity.
1 Throughout this paper it was used the current “Big 4” terminology, even though in 2000 there were still fi ve large multinational accounting fi rms: Andersen, Deloitte, Ernst 
& Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
2 cash fl ow from operations as funds from operations have been computed (as published under Brazilian GAAP) minus working capital accruals, interest expense and infl a-
tionary adjustments.
2 MEASURES OF ACCOUNTING QUALITY
2.1 Discretionary Accruals
Accruals can be broken down into discretionary and 
non-discretionary components. Discretionary accruals, 
measured by the original or by the modifi ed Jones model 
(JONES, 1991; DECHOW, SLOAN and SWEENEY, 1995), 
are often used in studies of quality because they are vulne-
rable to manipulation. Non-discretionary accruals, being 
driven by the fi rm’s level of operations, are assumed to be 
unrelated to quality.
Two measures of accruals were used: total accruals (net 
income minus operating cash fl ow2), and working capital 
accruals (increase in net working capital excluding short 
term debt, cash and cash equivalents.) Discretionary total 
accruals based on the original and modifi ed versions of the 
Jones model, for company i at year t, are denoted respec-
tively as DTA1it and DTA
2
it , and are estimated as the error 
terms in:
 TAit = α1t(1/Ait-1) + α2t∆REVit + α3tPPEit + εit (1)
and in:
 TAit = α1t(1/Ait-1) + α2t(∆REVit – ∆RECit)+ α3tPPEit + εit
  (2)
The following notation is used: (i is the fi rm, t is time)
 Ait-1 total assets at the end of t – 1;
 TAit total accruals divided by Ait-1;
 WKAit working capital accruals, ∆CAit – ∆CLit + ∆STDit 
– ∆CASHit, divided by Ait-1;
 ∆REVit revenues during t minus revenues during t – 1, di-
vided by Ait-1;
 ∆RECit receivables at the end of t minus receivables at the 
end of t – 1, divided by Ait-1;
 PPEit net property plant and equipment divided by Ait-1.
Discretionary working capital accruals for both ver-
sions of the Jones model are denoted DWKA1it and DWKA
2
it, 
and are estimated by expressions similar to [1] and [2], 
but with WKAit replacing TAit on the left-hand side and 
without the PPE term on the right-hand side.
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2.2 Compliance with GAAP
The second indicator of accounting quality is complian-
ce with GAAP. In particular, it was observed the degree to 
which listed companies that accepted the REFIS tax am-
nesty of 2000 complied with reporting requirements of the 
Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM). The CVM’s rules 
for the amnesty— Instruction No. 346 (of 09/2000)—are 
clear and the amnesty’s impact on most acceptors was 
signifi cant, which means that involuntary errors and omis-
sions should be rare and lack-of-materiality should not be 
a common reason for avoiding disclosure.
A key requirement of I#346 was for companies to dis-
close the net benefi t from the amnesty as an extraordinary 
item and to provide a detailed breakdown of the benefi t 
in footnotes. The gain attributable to the amnesty can be 
traced to penalties waived, previously unrecognized tax 
assets or liabilities and discounts on net operating loss 
carry forwards acquired. (Table 2, Panel B, contains a sum-
mary of I#346.)
The information content of the disclosures required by 
I#346 is not uniform. For example, item A (the impact of 
the amnesty on income) is a key input for estimating the 
value of securities issued by each company. However, the 
information provided in items E though H can be obtai-
ned easily from other sources or estimated by investors. 
Since the quality implications of not complying with any 
given item in I#346 depends on that item’s relevance to 
decision making by investors, two subsets of disclosures 
were considered: items needed and items not needed for 
decision making by investors.
To assess compliance with I#346 management’s dis-
cussion and analysis, the auditor’s letter, fi nancial state-
ments, and footnotes included in year 2000 fi nancial re-
ports for all publicly traded companies that accepted the 
amnesty were consultedand it was checked whether these 
companies complied in full, partially, or not at all with the 
mandatory requirements of I#346. It was assigned to each 
company 100 points in the fi rst case, 50 in the second, 
and zero in the third. Finally, a company’s decision-making 
and overall scores as the ratio of points assigned divided 
by the maximum points available in each category was 
computed, expressed as a percentage.
2.3 Conservatism
The third indicator of accounting quality is conserva-
tism, defi ned as timely recognition of contingent losses. Ac-
crual of contingencies can be used as a measure of quality in 
Brazil because they do not generate a deductible expense for 
tax purposes. Conservatism was measured using evidence 
regarding liabilities that were revealed for the fi rst time in 
December of 2000—when companies joined the amnesty—
that probably should have been disclosed before.
Companies that accepted the amnesty were committed 
to paying a reduced liability over an extended period of time 
at below market interest rates. Prior to accepting the am-
nesty, these companies were disputing the claim that taxes 
were overdue and they could have continued to do so had 
they rejected the amnesty. It was assumed that companies 
that accepted the amnesty weighed the expected liability 
value of rejecting the amnesty against the expected value of 
accepting the amnesty, and found the former to be greater.
According to Brazilian GAAP, the need and the format 
for disclosing contingent liabilities depends on the anticipa-
ted probability of loss.3 There are three cases: remote con-
tingencies need not be disclosed; reasonably possible con-
tingencies must be disclosed but not accrued; and probable 
contingencies must be described in footnotes and accrued 
if their values can be estimated. Brazilian standards are not 
precise about numerical probability thresholds for these 
three categories. Therefore, past due taxes included in the 
amnesty program could be in one of four possible conditions 
before December of 2000: (1) disclosed on the balance sheet 
as part of an installment agreement; (2) disclosed on the ba-
lance sheet as a probable contingent liability; (3) disclosed 
in the footnotes as a reasonably possible contingent liabil-
ity; or (4) they could be undisclosed. It was assume that 
all category (4) liabilities included in the amnesty were in 
violation of GAAP and should have been at least mentioned 
in footnotes by December of 1999. If perceived probability 
thresholds in Brazil are similar to those in the U.S., this is 
equivalent to assuming that all previously undisclosed liabil-
ities included in the amnesty had loss probabilities equal to 
or greater than 25%, the highest estimate of the remote/rea-
sonably possible threshold in the U.S. (RAGHUNANDAN et 
al., 1991; REIMERS, 1992; AHARONY and DOTAN, 2004.)
3 Accounting for loss contingencies under Brazilian GAAP is described in IBRACON Statement No. XIII.
3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In 2000 there were 769 listed companies in Brazil ac-
cording to the CVM’s website (http://www.cvm.gov.br/). 
Of these, 224 are eliminated for being government-con-
trolled or classifi ed as utilities or fi nancial institutions. 
Another 148 are eliminated for the following reasons: 77 
reported zero revenues in 2000; 38 had trading in their 
securities suspended; 3 were not operating or reported 
zero net income in 1999-2000; 11 were bankrupt; and 
19 did not fi le fi nancial reports for 2000. For each of 
the remaining 398 companies it was obtained fi nancial 
statements for 1999 and 2000, and also management’s 
discussion and analysis, footnotes, and the auditor’s let-
ter for 2000. Of those 398 companies, 97 joined the tax 
amnesty of 2000.
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In order to estimate discretionary accruals information 
on funds generated by operations was needed. In 1999 and 
2000, 108 and 86 respectively of the remaining 398 com-
panies in the sample did not fi le, or fi led incomplete funds 
fl ow statements. This reduces the effective sample size for 
estimation of discretionary accruals to 290 in 1999 and to 
312 in 2000. In the sample used to estimate discretionary 
accruals in 2000, most fi rms are engaged in manufacturing 
activities, the proportions being 64% in the full sample 
and 72% in the amnesty sub-sample. About 57% of fi rms 
in the full sample are audited by one of the Big 4, but only 
38% in the amnesty sub-sample. In terms of exchange lis-
ting, a higher percentage of companies that choose a Big 4 
auditor are listed on Bovespa and/or a U.S. exchange (72%) 
than companies that choose otherwise (65%).
Table 1 contrasts median values of total and working 
capital discretionary accruals, size, asset turnover, leverage 
and profi tability according to auditor choice in 1999-2000. 
There are signifi cant differences in discretionary accruals 
measured by the modifi ed Jones model (DTA2 and DWKA2) 
in 1999—when fi rms with a Big 4 auditor tend to post less 
income-decreasing accruals. There are no signifi cant diffe-
rences in discretionary accruals in 2000. Firms with a Big 4 
auditor are consistently larger based on mean and median 
total assets, and more profi table based on the median ra-
tio of operating profi ts to sales. There is also indication in 
2000 that fi rms with a Big 4 auditor carry less debt, based 
on the median ratio of liabilities to total assets.
Table 2, Panel A contains compliance statistics for each 
item in I#346. The fi rst column describes the disclosure, 
the second column has the number of fi rms in the sam-
ple that should have provided that disclosure, and the last 
three columns have the percentages of fi rms that complied 
in full, partially, or not at all. The percentage of fi rms that 
completely ignored each disclosure requirement varies from 
3.3% to 90.6%, with 44.3% of the 97 acceptors providing 
no information at all about the impact of the amnesty on 
income (item A). Another indicator of poor compliance is 
that, although all 74 fi rms that chose to pay the amnesty 
over a variable term were required to disclose the present 
value of the liability (item H), only 8.1% complied in full, 
18.9% provided some information, and 73% provided no 
information regarding the present value of the liability. Of 
the 97 amnesty companies, only 40 provided suffi cient in-
formation to allow estimation of the values of accepting 
and rejecting the amnesty. These are the companies for 
which the third measure of accounting quality (conserva-
tism) can be evaluated: 40 of these companies achieved an 
average decision-making score of 69.8 versus 28.1 for the 
remaining 57 companies.
In order to verify the degree to which the CVM enfor-
ced I#346, “Market Alert/Rectify and Republish Actions” 
(since 06/2001) and “Decisions of the CVM’s Collegiate 
in Appeals Processes” (since 08/2000) on the CVM’s web-
site were consulted.4 Most, if not all disciplinary actions 
taken by the CVM regarding annual reports for fi scal 2000 
should be included in one of these two archives. Of the 
97 fi rms in the sample of amnesty acceptors, only three 
were ordered by the CVM to republish year 2000 fi nancial 
statements due to violations of I#346.5 This is consistent 
with the generally low rankings achieved by Brazil in inter-
national comparisons of GAAP enforcement (La PORTA, 
LOPEZ-DE-SILANES and SHLEIFER, 1998; PATEL, BALIC and 
BWAKIRA, 2002.)
Table 3 contains a breakdown of amnesty liabilities for 
this group of 40 acceptors. The breakdown is according 
to whether, prior to the amnesty, liabilities had been re-
cognized as payable on the balance sheet (P-type), con-
tingent on the balance sheet or in the notes (C-type), 
or unrecognized (U-type). The fractions of the aggregate 
amnesty liability that had been recognized as P, C, and U 
were 40%, 10% and 50% respectively. The fraction of un-
recognized liabilities is higher for the 18 companies with 
a local auditor (68%) than for the 22 companies with a 
Big 4 auditor (40%).
4 The CVM’s powers to prescribe accounting standards and to require rectifi cation of fi nancial reports are established by Law 6385/1976. The penalties that the CVM can 
impose when accounting standards are violated range from warnings and fi nes to a 20-year prohibition from holding executive positions in listed companies.
5 Wetzel was required to republish its 2001 and 2002 reports to shareholders. Sultepa and Josapar were required to republish their 2000 reports. The case of Sultepa was the 
most serious, given an overall compliance score of only 12.5%, and an amnesty liability equivalent to about 20% of total liabilities. Three other acceptors had worse compliance 
scores and more material amnesty liabilities than Sultepa, but were not required to republish any reports.
4 STATISTICAL TESTS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
4.1 Discretionary Accruals
If discretionary accruals were driven mostly by earnings 
manipulation motives it would be expected that companies 
with a Big 4 auditor display more income-reducing discretio-
nary accruals than companies with a local auditor. The study 
showed that the opposite would be expected, however, if ac-
cruals are heavily infl uenced by tax minimization motives. Al-
though it is a priori unknown which of these two motives do-
minates in Brazil (where tax-to-GAAP conformity is strong), 
it is worthwhile to observe the pattern of discretionary ac-
cruals as a function of auditor choice. If we can assume that 
Big 4 audits produce higher quality fi nancial disclosures, and 
companies audited by the Big 4 have less income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals, then we can conclude that the Big 4 
are less tolerant of aggressive tax minimization strategies.
It was measured the association between auditor choi-
ce on total discretionary accruals by means of the following 
linear regression model, estimated for 1999 and 2000:
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where i is a fi rm index, and:
 DTAKi discretionary total accruals obtained with the 
original (k = 1) and modifi ed (k = 2) versions of 
the Jones model;
 AUDi auditor choice, 1 if auditor is Big 4 (AA, DT, EY, 
KPMG, PWC in 2000), 0 otherwise;
 LSTi listing choice, 1 if fi rm is listed on Bovespa or any 
U.S. exchange, 0 otherwise;
 HILEVi indicator of very high leverage, 1 if the company 
is in the highest decile according to the ratio of 
debt to total assets at year-end, 0 otherwise;
 NEGSEi indicator of negative shareholders’ equity, 1 if 
shareholders’ equity is negative at year-end, 0 
otherwise;
 SIZi fi rm size, equal to the natural logarithm of total 
assets at year-end;
 LABTAi magnitude of accruals, equal to the natural loga-
rithm of absolute total accruals;
Model [3] is similar to the model used in (BECKER et 
al., 1998), except that two variables were dropped—chan-
ge in shares outstanding and change in auditor—due to 
data collection costs, and it was added the choice of ex-
change listing and negative shareholders’ equity variables. 
High leverage can be associated with income-increasing 
accruals, in the case of fi rms that are close to violating 
debt covenants, or to income-decreasing accruals, in the 
case of distressed companies (DeFOND and JIAMBALVO, 
1994). Negative shareholders’ equity is introduced as an 
additional control for highly distressed companies. Since 
companies audited by the Big 4 are on average larger than 
companies with local auditors by value of total assets (Ta-
ble 1), and size can proxy for omitted variables, the natural 
log of total assets is included. The last variable is magni-
tude of accruals, because of the possibility that large dis-
cretionary accruals are associated with large total accruals. 
(There is some indication in Table 1 that, in 2000, working 
capital accruals are greater for the Big 4.)
To examine the association between auditor choice and 
working capital discretionary accruals, DWKAki was sub-
stituted on the left-hand side, and LABTAi was replaced by 
the log of absolute working capital accruals on the right-
hand side.
Results for 1999 and 2000 are given in Table 4. In ge-
neral, if discretionary accruals are determined by the origi-
nal Jones model, it cannot be rejected the null hypothesis 
that auditor choice is unrelated to discretionary accruals in 
1999 or in 2000. Switching to the modifi ed Jones model, 
it still cannot reject the null in 2000, but it does reject it 
in 1999. In 1999 the coeffi cient of AUD is positive in the 
models of total accruals (DTA2) and working capital accru-
als (DWKA2), implying that the expected value of discre-
tionary accruals conditional on choosing a Big 4 auditor is 
greater (i.e., more income-increasing) than if a local auditor 
is chosen.
These results imply that tests based on discretionary 
accruals fail to discriminate accounting quality in Brazil in 
1999-2000. If audit quality and accounting quality are re-
lated—in the sense that Big 4 auditors would engage in 
less income-increasing accruals than local auditors if there 
were no tax constraints on fi nancial reporting—and if the 
true coeffi cient of AUD is on average positive over time 
for the modifi ed Jones model, the implication is that Big 4 
auditors tolerate a less aggressive interpretation of the tax 
code than local auditors.
4.2 Compliance with GAAP
To test whether compliance with I#346 is affected by 
auditor and exchange listing choices, it was estimated the 
following cross-sectional regression model:
 DTAki = β0 + β1AUDi + β2LSTi + β3HILEVi + β4NEGSEi + β5SIZi + β6LABTAi + εi (3)
  CSCRi = β0 + β1AUDi + β2LSTi + β3HILEVi + β4NEGSEi + β5SIZi + β6CONi + εi  (4)
where i is a fi rm index, and:
 CSCRi compliance score with I#346, measured by the 
ratio of points obtained to maximum possible de-
cision making points (or overall points), expressed 
as a percentage,
 CONi concentration of control, measured by percentage 
of common and preferred shares owned by con-
trolling shareholders, and the other variables are 
as defi ned before.
Compliance to be positively related with the choices 
of a Big 4 auditor and with the decision to list on Bovespa 
or on a U.S. exchange is expected. It is also expected that 
this association be stronger when compliance refers to the 
decision-making items (more relevant disclosures to inves-
tors), than when compliance refers to absolutely all items 
of the CVM’s instruction. The regression model includes 
four other variables. Indicators for high leverage and for 
negative shareholders’ equity, as well as a measure of size, 
are included for consistency with model [3]. Risk and size 
proxy for reputation at stake and other potentially omitted 
variables (BECKER et al., 1998). The fourth variable is con-
centration of control, which allows for the possibility that 
fi rms with concentrated ownership produce better disclo-
sures (DeFOND and JIAMBALVO, 1991).6
Table 5, Panel A, shows the results of estimating model 
[4] with OLS for the decision-making and for the overall 
compliance scores. With the decision-making score as the 
6 It was not used the concentration of control variable in model [3] due to data collection constraints.
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dependent variable the null hypothesis (H0) that accoun-
ting quality is either unrelated to auditor choice or worse 
for Big 4 auditors is rejected, in favor of the alternative that 
quality is better for companies with a Big 4 auditor (p = 
.025).With the overall compliance score as the dependent 
variable it can only be rejected H0 at or above the 5.4 % 
level of signifi cance. The stronger result for auditor choice 
when the decision-making score is used as a measure of 
accounting quality is consistent with a heavier emphasis 
by auditors on disclosures that are relevant for capital allo-
cation decisions. The p-values for exchange listing choice 
are about.003 for both measures of compliance.
4.3 Timeliness of Loss Recognition
The model for timeliness versus auditor and exchange 
listing choices is:
TIMi = β0 + β1AUDi + β2LSTi + β3HILEVi + β4NEGSEi + β5SIZi + β6CONi + εi  (5)
where i is a fi rm index, and:
TIMi timeliness (compliance with GAAP for contingen-
cies) measured by the negative of the ratio of pre-
viously undisclosed tax liabilities to all tax liabili-
ties, and the other variables are as defi ned before. 
It was expected timeliness to be positively related 
with the choices of a Big 4 auditor and with the 
decision to list on Bovespa or on a U.S. exchange. 
The other independent variables are the same as in 
model [4], and are included for similar reasons.
Table 5, Panel B, has the results of estimating model 
[5] with OLS, which led to rejecting the hypothesis that 
timeliness is unrelated to auditor choice, or worse for Big 4 
auditors, in favor of the alternative that timeliness is better 
for companies with a Big 4 auditor (p – .041). It cannot be 
rejected, however, the hypothesis that timeliness is unre-
lated to choice of exchange listing.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper it was examined how publicly traded Bra-
zilian companies that accepted a national tax amnesty in 
2000 complied with the CVM’s disclosure requirements 
for the amnesty and for contingent liabilities. Based on 
these observations it was concluded that Brazilian com-
panies with a Big 4 auditor have better accounting quality 
than those with a local auditor when accounting quality is 
measured by compliance with GAAP or by conservatism. 
This result supports Holthausen’s (2003) conjecture that 
companies attempt to signal accounting quality by means 
of auditor choice in countries with good accounting princi-
ples but lenient enforcement of those principles.
However, the cross-sectional pattern of discretionary 
accruals—often used to measure quality in other coun-
tries—is unrelated to quality in Brazil. In fact, companies 
with Big 4 auditors in Brazil tend to recognize income more 
aggressively than companies with a local auditor. This is 
the opposite of what happens in other countries and it 
is consistent with local auditors interpreting the tax code 
(rather than GAAP) more aggressively than Big 4 auditors 
due to the strong linkage that exists between the Brazilian 
tax code and fi nancial reporting standards.
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APPENDIX A
Tax-to-GAAP Conformity in Brazil in 2000
To determine degree of fi nancial-tax conformity in Bra-
zil in 2000, Hung’s (2001) method was used, according 
to which tax-to-GAAP conformity is high if the combined 
score from the six items below is positive; otherwise, con-
formity is low.
1. Consensus estimate of tax-to-GAAP conformity: 
Strong-1; Moderate/Signifi cant-1½; Weak-0
 This estimate is not available for Brazil.
2. Are deferred taxes recognized? No-1; Limited-1½; 
Yes-0 
 Yes, according to CVM (Comissão de Valores Mobili-
ários) Instruction No. 273, NBCT (Normas Brasilei-
ras de Contabilidade) 19.2, and RIR (Regulamento 
do Imposto de Renda) art. 247-251.
3. Does legal form dominate substance? Yes-1; Some-
times-1½; No-0
 Ernst & Young (2002) reports on the ability of tax 
authorities in Latin America to challenge transac-
tions based on economic substance. E&Y reports 
that Brazil has historically applied a form over subs-
tance approach, but a new law passed in January 
2001 will allow authorities to disregard transac-
tions created with the sole purpose of minimizing 
taxation. Since these developments occurred after 
the time period studied, the answer is yes.
4. Is additional accelerated depreciation allowed? Yes-
1; Limited-1½; No-0
 Additional accelerated depreciation means meth-
ods other than declining balance or sum-of-years 
digits. There are two forms of accelerated deprecia-
tion in Brazil. According to articles, 313-323 of the 
tax code (RIR) fi rms can depreciate at straight-line 
rates above the usual rates for a variety of special 
cases in which the government wants to encou-
rage investment. Although the increase in depre-
ciation expense caused by this method is tax de-
ductible, it cannot be recognized in the fi nancial 
statements, and therefore leads to deferred tax lia-
bilities (i.e., no tax-to-GAAP linkage). According 
to article 312 of RIR, fi rms that work for a single 
daily 8-hour shift must apply standard straight-
line rates; fi rms that work two shifts can apply 
150% of the standard rates; and fi rms that work 
three shifts can apply 200% of the standard rates. 
These increases in depreciation expense must be 
recognized in the books, are not equivalent to any 
of the traditional depreciation methods, and are 
deductible for tax purposes. In this case, there is a 
linkage between tax and fi nancial reporting. There-
fore, yes.
5. Do amortization periods depend on tax laws? Yes-
1; Limited-1½; No-0
 According to article 327 of RIR the minimum is 5 
years, which is refl ected in IBRACON (Instituto Bra-
sileiro de Contadores) Statement VIII.
6. Does lease capitalization depend on tax laws? Yes-
1; Limited-1½; No-0
 Article 415 of RIR establishes criteria for capital 
leases. Brazilian GAAP in 2000 do not differentia-
te between capital and operating leases, requiring 
only that the asset and liability effects of capitali-
zing the lease be shown as a footnote. Therefore, 
item 6 is not applicable.
 The combined score is greater than zero, which 
implies a high degree of tax-GAAP conformity. 
Additional supporting evidence includes: depreci-
ation rates used in fi nancial reports are stipulated 
in the tax code; LIFO is never used, because it is 
not acceptable for tax purposes; and the amortiza-
tion period for R&D assets is based on the tax code 
(KPMG, 2001).
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 Tabela 1  Sample Descriptive Statistics by Auditor Type in 1999-2000
Medians Means
(a) (b) test a=b (c) (d) test c=d
Local Big 4 K-W Local Big 4 2-tailed t
p-value p-value
1999 N=129 N=161 N=129 N=161
DTA1 % .44 -.10 .831 -2.42 1.33 .217
DTA2 % -.65 1.86 .130 -4.39 2.42 .025 *
DWKA1 % -1.24 -.54 .271 -3.33 .76 .115
DWKA2 % -1.02 -.09 .023 -4.82 1.25 .015 ***
Abs(DTA1) % 9.69 7.49 .074 14.56 12.43 .410
Abs(DTA2) % 6.68 6.08 .909 12.61 11.96 .807
Abs(DWKA1) % 7.73 4.79 .113 11.30 8.96 .310
Abs(DWKA2) % 4.35 3.52 .594 9.16 7.83 .568
TA R$ mill 93.2 427.8 .000 500.1 1,162.1 .013 ***
ATO x .62 .69 .173 .72 .77 .461
TL/TA % 69.1 59.2 .106 90.6 72.9 .208
OpInc/Sales % -4.05 .79 .012 -481.00 -14.43 .326 *
2000 N=132 N=180 N=132 N=180
DTA1 % -.42 -.18 .653 -.71 -.15 .807
DTA2 % 1.34 -.38 .153 1.11 -.92 .361
DWKA1 % 1.23 2.47 .496 2.39 3.44 .613
DWKA2 % 2.01 .98 .263 2.75 1.63 .574
Abs(DTA1) % 6.96 5.76 .183 12.67 10.11 .168
Abs(DTA2) % 6.36 4.94 .031 12.20 8.63 .054 *
Abs(DWKA1) % 6.27 5.33 .144 11.49 8.70 .111
Abs(DWKA2) % 5.57 3.70 .003 10.89 6.97 .021 ***
TA R$ mill 97.9 504.7 .000 376.1 1,342.8 .000 ***
ATO x .60 .73 .031 .67 .81 .031 ***
TL/TA % 71.1 61.6 .025 99.7 84.8 .495 *
OpInc/Sales % .10 3.51 .001 -47.90 -15.30 .206 *
The sample consists of 290 fi rm observations in 1999 and 312 fi rm observations in 2000. The data is obtained from the CVM’s website. Government-controlled 
fi rms, utilities and fi nancial institutions, as well as fi rms that were suspended from trading, bankrupt, did not fi le a funds fl ow statement, or were not operating 
at the end of 2000 are excluded. Means and medians are given for discretionary accruals, the magnitude of discretionary accruals, total assets, asset turnover, 
leverage, and profi tability. The hypothesis that the medians (means) of fi rms with Big 4 or local auditors are equal is verifi ed with the Kruskall-Wallis test (2-tailed t 
test). “***” indicates that both null hypothesis (of equal means and medians are rejected). “*” indicates that one of the hypothesis is rejected, but not the other.
Notation:
DTAk – discretionary total accruals per original (k=1) and modifi ed (k=2) Jones models;
DWKAk  – discretionary working capital accruals per original and modifi ed Jones models;
TA  – total assets at year-end;
ATO – asset turnover, defi ned as sales divided by total assets at year-end;
TL/TA – leverage, defi ned as total liabilities divided by total assets at year-end;
OpInc/Sales –income from continuing operations before tax and before extraordinary items divided by sales.
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 Tabela 2  Compliance with I#346 by Listed Companies that Accepted the Amnesty
Panel A: Average Disclosure Scores for Mandatory Items in CVM’s Instruction No. 346
 ↓ (Items marked * contrinute to decision-making score) N Full Partial Not at All
 * A disclose the impact of amnesty on income 97 25.8% 29.9% 44.3%
  Ba loss due to lower rate allowed on NOL carryforwards 16 25.0% 68.8% 6.3%
  Bb gain from recognition of previously unrecognized tax credits 30 63.3% 33.3% 3.3%
 * Bc gain on acquisition of NOL’s 19 26.3% 52.6% 21.1%
  Bd gain or loss from “consolidation” of liabilities - - - -
 * C explain liability according to origin and nature 97 55.7% 30.9% 13.4%
 * D disclose NOL’s used to offset interest and penalties 68 52.9% 17.6% 29.4%
  E describe collateral offered 96 26.0% 27.1% 46.9%
  F disclose circumstances and risks of exclusion from amnesty 96 5.2% 4.2% 90.6%
  G list the obligations implied by acceptance of amnesty 96 14.6% 19.8% 65.6%
  H disclose PV of amnesty debt and underlying assumptions 74 8.1% 18.9% 73.0%
 * I report the amounts paid to amortize the amnesty debt 74 66.2% 4.1% 29.7%
Panel B: Instruction No. 346 by the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) Disclosure I#346
A through G apply to all companies that joined the amnesty
A Disclose the amnesty’s impact separately on the income statement. I/S Art 1, § I
B Explain the amnesty’s impact on income by means of its components. Notes Art 1, § I
C
Explain the amnesty liability according to origin (type of tax) and nature (principal, interest and penal-
ties).
Notes Art 3, (a)
D
Provide the amounts of tax credits and net operating loss carryforwards used to offset interest and 
penalties.
Notes Art 3, (c)
E Describe the collateral offered to cover the amnesty liability. Notes Art 3, (f)
F Disclose signifi cant risks of exclusion from the amnesty. Notes Art 3, (h)
G List the obligations implied by the acceptance of the amnesty. Notes Art 3, (g)
H and I apply only to companies that choose the standard payment method
H
Disclose present value of the amnesty liability and assumptions used to compute it. Present value 
calculations must be revised whenever there is a signifi cant change in the premises adopted, or at 
least once a year.
Notes Art 3, (b)
I Disclose amounts paid towards the amnesty during the fi scal period. Notes Art 3, (d)
Item J is allowed, but not required, of companies that choose the standard payment method
J
If (i) the company can meet its amnesty obligations; (ii) assumptions used for present value have been 
approved by the board and auditors; and (iii) the discount rate used is appropriate, then the amnesty 
liability can be recorded at its present value. The difference between the discounted and undiscounted 
values of the liability must be deferred and recognized gradually as income as the debt is paid off. 
B/S Art 1, § II
Panel A: Scores are assigned depending on the degree to which companies complied with requirements of I#346 listed on the left. Items marked * are needed to 
estimate the values of accepting and rejecting the amnesty, and contribute to the decision-making score. The overall score covers all disclosure items dictated by 
I#346. The column titled N shows the number of companies in the sample that should have provided each disclosure in their 2000 annual reports to sharehold-
ers. The next three columns contain the percentages of the N companies that complied in full, partially, and not at all with each requirement.
Panel B: The amnesty’s effects must be disclosed (and recorded) in the quarter when the decision to accept the amnesty is made. A “fato relevante” advisory to 
the market is required.
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 Tabela 3  Undisclosed, Contingent and Payable Taxes as of Year-End 1999 for
Companies that Accepted the Tax Amnesty of 2000
By Auditor Choice:
R$ Millions Fractions of Total
N P C U Total P C U
AA 11   861 115   811 1,788 .48  .06 .45
DT 1 -  38    23    61 -  .62 .38
EY 4   104 117    -1   219 .47  .53 -
KPMG 1 -  10    -3     7 - 1.00 -
PWC 5    91  41   102   234 .39  .17 .44
Big 4 auditors 22 1,056 321   932 2,309 .46  .14 .40
Local auditors 18   364  37   839 1,240 .29  .03 .68
TOTAL 40 1,420 358 1,771 3,549 .40  .10 .50
Breakdown of the total amnesty liability by auditor type and according to whether, prior to the amnesty (i,e., by year-end 1999), the liabilities that these compa-
nies included in the amnesty were: [P-type] recognized as payable on the balance sheet; [C-type] recognized as contingent either on the balance sheet or in the 
notes to the fi nancial statements; or [U-type] absolutely undisclosed. The 40 companies represented in this table are those that provided suffi cient information in 
the 2000 annual report for the estimation of the values of accepting and rejecting the amnesty.  
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